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MOZAMBIQUE IS SUFFERING A MILITARY EXPRESSION 
OF A POLITICAL PROBLEM 
AN INTERVIEW WITH HISTORIAN MICHEL CAHEN FOR THE ROSA LUXEMBURG 
FOUNDATION SOUTHERN AFRICA 
FREDSON GUILENGUE 
 
Mozambique is currently facing one of the most 
challenging tests of its capacity to resolve the 
country’s political, economic and social challenges.  
Politically, a ceasefire agreement signed between 
the Government of Frente de Libertação de 
Moçambique (FRELIMO) and the main opposition 
party, the Resistência Nacional de Moçambique 
(RENAMO) on 24 August 2014 was short-lived. It 
only served to clear the way for the country’s 
general elections on 15 October 2014, at which 
time the highly contested results by RENAMO 
brought about another round of military conflict.  
Economically, the national currency, Metical, has 
been consistently devaluing against, for example, 
the South African Rand, the American Dollar and 
the Euro, when potential gains from newly 
discovered resources (e.g. offshore gas) have failed 
to produce any tangible improvement to people’s 
lives. This, in conjunction with the discovery of 
hidden debt of 1, 4 billion USD, led partners like 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank (WB) and the British to suspend further 
financial aid to the country. It is therefore expected 
that these political and economic developments 
will lead to political upheaval if the Government 
does not address questions fast and adequately.1 
To better understand Mozambique’s current 
political developments from a political-historical 
perspective, Fredson Guilengue, Programme 
Manager at the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung 
Southern Africa (RLS) interviewed historian 
Michel Cahen (MC). Michel Cahen is an authority 
on Portuguese colonisation in Africa and a political 
analyst of Portuguese speaking African Countries 
(PALOPs). He is the Director of Research at the 
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique 
(CNRS) at “Les Afriques dans le monde” Research 
Centre at the Institute for Political Studies in 
Bordeaux, France. As an accredited historian of 
Mozambican and Angolan contemporary history, 
                                                          
ϭ The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank 
(WB), the United Kingdom and a group of 14 other direct 
supporters of the Mozambican budget, have recently 
suspended financial aid to the country due to a highly 
controversial commercial loan from the Credit Suisse 
Bank and the Russian VTB recently uncovered by the 
international press and acknowledged by the Government 
of Mozambique. The debt is estimated to be in excess of 
1, 4 billion dollars and forms part of extensive loans by 
the Government of Mozambique between 2009 and 2014 
which were neither disclosed to parliament nor to its 
international aid partners. According to the Government, 
it withheld the information fearing that its opponent in a 
civil war, RENAMO, would have access to sensitive 
information. However, it is now known that, while part of 
these funds were used to acquire military equipment, a 
very substantial amount simply disappeared.   
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Cahen has written extensively on Mozambique’s 
political developments.     
RLS: MOZAMBIQUE’S ELECTORAL PROCESSES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN HIGHLY 
CONTESTED DUE TO ALLEGATIONS OF ELECTORAL FRAUD BY THE RULING 
PARTY FRENTE DE LIBERTAÇÃO DE MOÇAMBIQUE (FRELIMO) AS WELL AS 
OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING A GENERAL PERCEPTION THAT POLITICAL 
POWER SHOULD ALTERNATE BETWEEN PARTIES TO ACHIEVE A MATURE 
DEMOCRACY. TO WHAT EXTENT DO FRELIMO’S VICTORIES THREATEN DE 
FACTO  DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE? 
MC: This is a complex question as it must be 
viewed in different historical periods. Despite the 
fact that the anticolonial liberation war was carried 
out in probably no more than fifteen percent of the 
country’s territory (an aspect that in terms of a 
guerrilla-like war is already very significant), there 
should be no doubt that at independence in 1975, 
if the country had not opted for a single-party state 
system, FRELIMO would still have had an eighty 
percent chance of winning. FRELIMO had the 
necessary legitimacy of the gun; it had defeated 
the Portuguese and it was a liberation movement 
for independence.  
However, the single-party system severely divided 
the Mozambican population. With the fusion of 
party and state there was no space for any 
independent structure to correct mistakes. Only the 
highest structures within FRELIMO were allowed 
to criticise the government. An example of this was 
the famous Samora Machel’s presidential 
“offensive” in 1983.Ϯ This was the highest structure 
putting pressure on the medium structures of the 
state hierarchy. It was also followed by the 
paradigm of  authoritarian  modernisation  without  
                                                          
Ϯ In the 80’s FRELIMO adopted a strategy of self-criticism 
to reinforce its authority and leadership. Thus Samora 
Machel, both president of the party and the country 
(1975-1986), led the so-called “Presidential Campaigns”. 
These campaigns, also meant to introduce reforms and 
change, included: the 1976 Production Offensive; the 
1978 Campaign to build the party organisation and the 
1980 Presidential Offensive against corruption; etc. (see: 
Newitt 1995). Marlyn Newitt, A History of Mozambique 
(London: Hurst & Company, 1995), 545.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
any social gains for the sector of the population 
defended by FRELIMO. This paradigm expressed 
the idea that the peasantry had to be forcefully 
modernised by living in rural cities, the so-called 
“communal villages”. The consequence of building 
these villages was an agronomic, cultural and 
political catastrophe for the country and deeply 
divided the Mozambican population. The civil war 
in Mozambique was not a peasant revolution, but 
the peasants used the structures of the guerrilla, 
introduced by outsiders, to protect themselves 
against the state foisting authoritarian 
modernisation upon them.  
There is an intense political culture instilled by 
FRELIMO in which electoral fraud emerges as a 
local responsibility. A local party member does not 
require any orientation from the central committee 
to organise electoral fraud. The member engages 
in this type of activity because the premise is that 
RENAMO should never be allowed to win. A 
doctorate student of mine from Mozambique who 
conducted a study in the south of the country 
explained how a relative of his, who was an 
Michel Cahen 
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electoral officer at a voting station, destroyed 
ballots to prevent the opposition from winning. So 
for me the real question to ask would be to what 
extent did fraud affect electoral results in 
Mozambique? It is also very difficult to report fraud 
because FRELIMO possesses more qualified staff 
than the other parties and controls the entire state 
apparatus. Although the Movimento Democrático 
de Moçambique (MDM) also has qualified cadres, 
it is still a small party.ϯRENAMO is a powerful party 
but suffers a severe lack of personnel. Thus, at 
many voting stations RENAMO or MDM observers 
were either not properly trained, had been freshly 
recruited just prior to the process, or could even 
have been appointed by FRELIMO.  
Meanwhile, it is the concept of the party-nation 
that poses the most serious threat to democratic 
advancement in Mozambique. This ideal also 
comprises the rule that the “winner takes all”.ϰ As 
a result of this system, we find in provinces like 
Zambézia and Nampula, where the population has 
always voted for the opposition, all positions of 
power are occupied by FRELIMO members, i.e. the 
governor, all district administrators, all managers of 
public services, all private bank managers and all 
the local leaders recognised by the government are 
FRELIMO supporters. This situation causes despair 
and anger, not only with members of the 
opposition, but also among the local population. In 
this instance, the “winner takes all” principle 
                                                          
ϯ The Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (MDM) 
was formed in March 2009 as a splinter movement 
comprising ex-RENAMO members and supporters under 
the leadership of Daviz Mbepo Simango, the mayor of 
Beira, Mozambique’s second largest city. Today it is the 
third most important opposition party in Mozambique.       
ϰ According to Michel Cahen, the electoral system in 
which the “winner takes all” doesn’t only govern the 
election per se, it also defines how power is allocated 
after the election. As a result, in Mozambique, the elected 
winner has been the one who has been in charge of 
governing the entire country, i.e. the winning party ends 
up controlling all government departments such as public 
administration, army, judiciary etc. Michel Cahen, e-mail 
message to author, May 18, 2016.
nullifies the vote. It is different in urban areas 
declared as municipalities because municipal 
elections take place. There are only fifty-eight 
municipalities in Mozambique, so there are no 
elections in the rest of the territory, no 
decentralisation - only de-concentration.  
Again it is the “winner takes all” principle that is 
firmly rooted in FRELIMO’s cultural politic that 
most threatens democratic development in 
Mozambique. Because a person’s vote doesn’t 
appear to change anything, we see a situation 
where so many people abstain from the voting 
process. This happened some years after the 
massive fraud of 1999 when RENAMO-dominated 
territories stopped voting and was evidenced by 
electoral results in which FRELIMO’s electoral 
percentage continued increasing to sixty-two 
percent in 2004, while the actual number of votes 
decreased. Simultaneously, RENAMO’s electorate 
slowly disappeared. People once again started 
voting after the 2013 military crises when 
Dhlakama rebranded himself as a powerful leader. 
The electorate decided to vote again because they 
thought they were voting for change, but once 
again nothing changed at regional and local levels 
even when the opposition won. It is obvious that 
the party capturing the majority of votes at national 
level should form the government, but at local level 
there should be space for opposition members and 
local leaders. This currently doesn’t exist. There is 
no political representation and this model is a 
serious threat to democracy. By this I am not 
implying that RENAMO is a beacon of democracy. 
It is yet another authoritarian party with a poor 
democratic concept.           
RLS: MANY PEOPLE ASSOCIATE THE CURRENT POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN 
MOZAMBIQUE WITH THE DISCOVERY OF MINERAL RESOURCES. THIS 
ASSOCIATION IS PARTIALLY BASED ON THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF 
“RESOURCE CURSE”. HOWEVER, THERE IS NOT NECESSARILY A DIRECT 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ABUNDANCE OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND A 
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POLITICAL CRISIS. ARE THERE FACTORS THAT COULD INFLUENCE THIS 
RELATIONSHIP?      
MC: I think such analyses have to differentiate 
between national and local circumstances. At local 
level, the people from Cabo Delgado, at the 
extreme-north of Mozambique, where gas and 
petrol have been found, are already noticing a 
number of investments from which no social 
benefits are forthcoming. From a national 
perspective, I believe that the poverty level of 
Mozambicans today is no worse than twenty years 
ago. However, after twenty years the poor are 
noticing that there is a small minority that is 
grabbing everything and enriching itself. So while 
the poverty level of the majority remains static, 
they are observing a rising bourgeoisie. This 
dissatisfaction has not yet been politically 
manifested.  
The 2008/2010 riots in Maputo, when the cost of 
the price of petrol and cost of living increased, 
were only social uprisings to ask the “boss” for a 
favour. I still remember a young man who was 
burning a tyre during the riots saying, “We are 
crying for our father”. This meant that they were 
asking Guebuza who was then the president to 
treat them well. It was still the subject demanding 
something from his master. It was akin to asking 
for a favour and not for a right within the republic. 
These riots had no political impact.  
However, it is important to remember that during 
the 2013 municipal elections a year prior to the 
general elections in 2014, MDM obtained 45% of 
the results in Maputo and Matola municipalities, 
and it is highly probable that it might have won the 
elections. Surprisingly, there was a two-hour 
power cut at the precise moment when the votes 
were being counted.  
For an opposition party to obtain 45% at the heart 
of FRELIMO’s social base was an enormous 
achievement. I was also very impressed with the 
excellent “score” obtained by RENAMO in the 
2014 general elections in which it obtained 20% in 
Maputo. This percentage cannot only be attributed 
to the migrants from northern Mozambique who 
live in Maputo. This means that there is a section 
of the poor who voted for RENAMO to express 
dissatisfaction with FRELIMO. This is politically 
important. An imminent increase in the price of 
transport, together with the devaluation of the 
metical in relation to the rand and the dollar, will 
certainly trigger riots which may have some 
political overtones, something completely different 
from the unrest of 2008/2010.  
I would say that today there are different facets to 
the relationship between mineral abundance and 
political turmoil. People are well-informed about 
new mineral resources and there is no longer 
widespread civil war. Furthermore, people are 
noticing the country’s bourgeoisie becoming ever 
richer. Everyone knows that Guebuza is behind 
EMATUM and probably also behind PROÍNDICUS 
and so on.ϱ 
RLS: PRESIDENT NYUSI BEGAN HIS MANDATE DEMONSTRATING AN 
APPARENT SENSIBILITY TO THE ISSUES RAISED BY RENAMO. RECENTLY, 
HOWEVER, HE SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN A HARDER STANCE IN RELATION TO 
RENAMO’S PROJECT OF AUTONOMOUS PROVINCES. THIS GIVES THE 
IMPRESSION THAT FRELIMO IS REFUSING TO STRUCTURALLY CHANGE THE 
STATE. FOR EXAMPLE, FRELIMO HAS TAKEN THE INITIATIVE OF DESIGNING 
AND APPROVING THE “STATUS OF THE OPPOSITION LEADER” GIVING IT SOME 
DIRECT BENEFITS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT HAS ALSO REFUSED TO CHANGE 
THE STATE STRUCTURE TO ACCOMMODATE RENAMO IN THE PROCESS OF 
GOVERNANCE IN MOZAMBIQUE. IS THIS ATTITUDE NEW OR HAS IT ALWAYS 
BEEN PART OF THE PARTY’S STRATEGY OF STATE BUILDING?          
MC: I think we have all the necessary elements to 
be able to answer this question. This attitude is 
                                                          
ϱ Empresa Moçambicana de Pesca de Atum (EMATUM) 
is a new state-owned tuna fishing company that, in 2013, 
received $ 850 million allegedly earmarked for the tuna 
fishing industry. PROINDICUS SA is a share company 
that obtained $ 622 million allegedly for military 
equipment for the protection of Mozambique’s “exclusive 
economic zones”.      
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inherently part of FRELIMO’s political culture. As I 
said, FRELIMO sees itself as a party-nation so it is 
considers it inconceivable to lose power as it is the 
nation. FRELIMO has to maintain power 
everywhere and by any means. Because RENAMO 
demanded recognition as the winner of only six of 
the eleven provinces, I am of the opinion that a 
constitutional amendment would allow the 
provincial assemblies to elect governors. These 
governors would then oversee the district and the 
local structures. However, FRELIMO refused to 
make any constitutional amendment. In fact, even 
without a constitutional amendment, President 
Nyusi himself could have simply appointed some 
RENAMO elected governors. But he preferred not 
to do so.
At the beginning Nyusi was attempting to appear 
more accessible and open-minded than Guebuza. 
Thereby directly opposing Guebuza. It is also 
important to stress that Guebuza was still the 
president of FRELIMO and, according to its 
statutes, every militant is bound to obey the 
president of the party. This would imply that Nyusi, 
the country’s president, was beholden to Guebuza, 
the party’s president, meaning that the functioning 
of the republic depended on the statutes of a 
private entity being the party.  
Meanwhile, Nyusi’s successful removal of Guebuza 
as FRELIMO’s president was a narrow victory as it 
effectively fused the state and the party. With 
Guebuza’s ousting as party president, FRELIMO 
effectively confirmed that the President of the 
Republic must also be the party’s President. This 
was very unfortunate as it is exactly this system 
that creates “Guebuzas”. Now that Guebuza’s 
influence within the party has weakened, Nyusi has 
started applying a military solution to the country’s 
political problems. One should also not ignore that 
Nyusi was Guebuza’s Minister of Defence. It was 
Nyusi who led the war against RENAMO in 
2013/2014. We can always ask questions such as: 
Is it possible that Nyusi wants to negotiate peace 
with RENAMO but is limited by lack of full control 
over the military? Or is he just playing a double 
role? Nonetheless, Nyusi must accept ultimate 
responsibility because the three attempts to kill 
Dhlakama, the attempt to kill RENAMO’s General 
Secretary, the assassination of RENAMO’s 
Delegate to the State National Security Council 
were all orchestrated by the security forces under 
Nyusi’s control. If you read the declarations of the 
latest meeting of FRELIMO’s Central Committee, it 
is clear that there will be no negotiation without the 
complete disarmament of RENAMO.  
Today, neither FRELIMO nor RENAMO want to 
negotiate. Remember that Dhlakama promised to 
assume control of the six provinces in March, but 
we are now in April and nothing has transpired. I 
believe he accepts that he doesn’t have the 
necessary military might to capture large towns 
such as Beira and Quelimane, but he is going to 
invest in a guerrilla war. He possesses the means 
to do so. In Southern Mozambique the clashes are 
not yet as many as in the northern and central 
parts of the country. This is probably because 
RENAMO’s soldiers have received direct orders 
from Dhlakama not to expand the attacks. I think 
Dhlakama will escalate the conflict gradually to 
strengthen his influence over the government. 
Even the Catholic Church, with its apparent 
personal contacts with him, has been unable to 
achieve anything. Nobody wants to negotiate.ϲ
FRELIMO doesn’t want to negotiate because it 
believes that it can annihilate RENAMO, as was the 
case with UNITA in Angola, which I believe was a 
huge mistake. RENAMO doesn’t want to negotiate 
because it needs to weight the power balance in its 
favour.                                       
                                                          
ϲ This interview was conducted on 26 April 2016. 
However, on 17 May 2016 RENAMO’s leader Afonso 
Dhlakama announced that he had accepted an offer to 
engage in conflict negotiations with government.  
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RLS: RENAMO’S DISARMAMENT SEEMS TO BE REGARDED BY MANY FORCES 
WITHIN MOZAMBIQUE AS THE DETERMINANT OF EFFECTIVE PEACE. THIS 
ARGUMENT SUGGESTS THAT THE POLITICAL UPRISING IN MOZAMBIQUE IS 
LINKED TO THE POSSESSION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS BY RENAMO. 1) 
WHAT POSSIBLE SCENARIO CAN WE EXPECT FOR MOZAMBIQUE IF THE 
OBJECTIVE OF DISARMING RENAMO IS NOT ACHIEVED? 2) DOES RENAMO’S 
DISARMAMENT REPRESENT THE ENTIRE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
VIOLENT POLITICAL REBELLIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE?    
MC: It’s true that RENAMO possesses arms but I 
don’t believe they have heavy artillery. They don’t 
have tanks; they have 60 and 88 mm mortars, 
RPG-7’s and Kalashnikovs. Most of the arms were 
captured from FRELIMO military bases. It is also 
rumoured that in 2014 a train load of modern 
military equipment coming from Zimbabwe was 
intercepted by RENAMO. I think RENAMO has no 
problem either buying or capturing military 
equipment for its troops. But this doesn’t mean 
that RENAMO has sufficient military equipment to 
supply all the young men who have recently joined 
its forces.  
Irrespective of whether RENAMO has the military 
force or not, it doesn’t represent an obstacle to 
peace in Mozambique because the country has a 
political not a military problem. This is a merely a 
military expression of a political problem. If the 
country is able to resolve the challenges arising 
from the “winner takes all” system; if it’s possible 
even to imagine that the country’s president can 
be from FRELIMO and the provincial governors 
from other parties and vice-versa; if it is accepted 
that national unity is not necessarily the same as 
national homogeneity; if RENAMO’s social base is 
allocated its share, particularly in respect of the 
newly identified resources, and the social situation 
of the majority of Mozambicans improves, then the 
RENAMO problem is easily resolved. RENAMO’s 
forces wish to be socially reintegrated either into 
the army or police forces. The country needs 
political reform to end the homogenised vision of 
the Mozambican nation. It’s important to 
understand that Mozambique is nothing more than 
“a colonial space” created by the coloniser; that it 
is not a nation and that there are twenty-five 
different ethnic groups of which twenty-three 
remain outside the existing geographic borders. 
The onlypossibility of achieving national unity is to 
build a republic that can provide economic and 
social advancement for the whole nation. Progress 
will first bring a political and later a cultural identity 
to the nation. FRELIMO’s current behaviour is 
fostering anti-state sentiment as people attempt to 
protect themselves from the state instead of 
integrating themselves into it.  
In response to your second question, it would have 
been advantageous if progressive Mozambican 
NGO’s had formed a civil, pacifistic political party 
to organise demonstrations, etc., however, in the 
absence of this type of party or  form of protest, 
and hypothesising the end of RENAMO, I don’t 
think there will be other military rebellions in 
Mozambique. But this considers RENAMO already 
dead, which I doubt will happen!  
RLS: IS IT POSSIBLE TO LINK THE PARTIZATION 7 OF THE STATE IN 
MOZAMBIQUE TO THE LACK OF TRUST IN THE (TECHNICAL) STRUCTURES 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESSES?     
MC: I guess you must be referring to the problem 
between the National Electoral Commission (CNE) 
and the Technical Secretariat for Electoral
Management (STAE).ϴ There is a very serious 
                                                          
ϳ The term “partization” of the state used here is to refer 
to the full control or domination by political or political 
parties of the state apparatus. “De-partization” is to free 
the state apparatus from control or domination by 
political or political parties.   
ϴ The National Electoral Commission (CNE) is by 
definition an independent body subordinated only to the 
country’s constitution. The CNE is responsible for 
supervising voter registration, the conduct of elections 
and holding of referenda. The Technical Secretariat for 
Electoral Management (STAE) is a state body. It is headed 
by a General Director appointed by the country’s 
President after a public nomination process. The General 
Director is assisted by two deputies during the election 
period who are nominated by the political parties that are 
represented in Parliament (currently: FRELIMO, RENAMO 
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problem in this regard which has never been 
addressed, not even when the last electoral act 
was amended at RENAMO’s insistence. While the 
CNE is a public institution, the STAE which literally 
performs all the major tasks is under the control of 
the Ministry of Public Administration. Thus all its
high level personnel are FRELIMO members. These 
people will always side with FRELIMO and 
produces, what I would call, “structural fraud”. 
Structural fraud begins at voter registration, a 
process that is not uniformly structured across the 
country. Everyone is aware that the electoral 
personnel are FRELIMO members and that one can 
have a better life as a FRELIMO supporter. This is a 
form of daily neopatrimonialism where permanent 
pressure is applied to force people to side with 
power. Poverty per se doesn’t cause revolt as it 
only pushes people to look for protection. So 
people seek relatives to assist them get what they 
are actually looking for.  
It’s an absolute necessity to “de-particise the 
state”. During Guebuza’s two mandates he “re-
particized” the state, while during Chissano’s 
mandates (after the single party system from1994 
to 2004), the state was more important than the 
party. With Guebuza the party returned to being 
more important than the state. The party now 
again fully governs the state. Hence there is no 
conceptual problem to expect public servants to 
participate in FRELIMO’s meetings during working 
hours. Public servants at all levels are invited to 
participate in these meetings and are expected to 
attend. No other political party is allowed to do the 
same. Actually, there was agreement between two 
teams of negotiators on the “departization of the 
state”, one of RENAMO’s demands, but a day later 
                                                                                    
and MDM). The other staff members of STAE are 
appointed through a public bid based on professional and 
technical background. The functions of STAE include 
registration of voters and supervision and conduct of all 
electoral processes. 


it was rejected by FRELIMO’s parliamentary 
majority. The “partization” of the Mozambican 
state apparatus by FRELIMO is a very deeply held 
conviction. As the party has always governed 
Mozambique in this way, people tend to believe 
that FRELIMO is the father of the state. The 
consequence is that the partization of the state 
apparatus has never been questioned because it is 
so firmly ingrained in the population’s 
understanding of its relationship with the state.        
RLS: THE DISAGREEMENTS DURING THE SO-CALLED “POLITICAL DIALOGUE” 
(2013 - 2015) BETWEEN RENAMO AND THE GOVERNMENT OF 
MOZAMBIQUE STARTED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT 
FOR “DEPARTIZATION” OF THE STATE AND DEGENERATED INTO SALVOS 
ABOUT MILITARY ISSUES.  IS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY OF A NEGOTIATED 
SOLUTION FOR MOZAMBIQUE, OR IT IS DEFINITELY NECESSARY THAT ONE OF 
THE ACTORS SHOULD BE COMPLETELY ELIMINATED SO THAT THE OTHER CAN 
CLAIM HEGEMONY OVER THE COUNTRY’S POLITICS?      
MC: I think the Angolan solution in which the 
death of Jonas Savimbi meant peace for the 
country is not applicable to the Mozambican 
situation. Although Angola is also geographically 
and ethnically heterogeneous, the wealth of the 
political powerful subordinates literally everyone. 
Even with the advent of the exploitation of 
extensive mineral resources in Mozambique, the 
politically powerful will never have enough money 
to subjugate everyone. In fact, there is a joke in 
Luanda that to get rich quickly one just has to 
create an opposition party that can later be 
“bought” by the regime. It’s difficult to apply this 
to Mozambique.  
Hegemony and homogeneity are two different 
things. In such a heterogeneous country like 
Mozambique in geographic and historical terms 
hegemony would be less probable and 
undesirable. Although it would apparently bring 
peace, it would be what I would call an “armed 
peace” and not democracy. We have to resolve the 
crisis of political representation to allow more 
democracy and more popular expression. 
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Mozambique needs to create national unity in the 
sense of allowing everybody to live and experience 
social and economic progress.  
RLS: IN LINE WITH THE PREVIOUS QUESTION, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE 
PHYSICAL ELIMINATION OF RENAMO’S LEADER COULD SPELL THE END OF 
WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE AND THE WEAKENING OF RENAMO TO A LEVEL 
SIMILAR TO UNITA IN ANGOLA?   
MC: They have been and are still trying to do it. 
This would be bad. What most people have not yet 
understood is that within RENAMO Dhlakama is a 
moderate. There are many people within the party 
who yearn to once again take up arms. It is 
Dhlakama who has avoided this route. If Dhlakama 
dies who will assume power? The son of André 
Matsangaissa who is said to have returned from 
Kenya and appears to be a good soldier? Is it Ivone 
Soares? In any case, if Dhlakama dies a more 
radical wing within RENAMO might assume 
control.  Maybe this is what the government wants 
- a military confrontation that FRELIMO is 
convinced it will win. FRELIMO believes that it will 
physically eliminate Dhlakama and militarily 
eliminate RENAMO because it still ascribes 
RENAMO’s existence to the backing of the South 
African apartheid regime. Because the apartheid 
regime no longer exists, FRELIMO thinks RENAMO 
is weak. It is a huge mistake. However, FRELIMO 
is not thinking about the economic crisis which is 
driving the country into a depression.  
RENAMO is very different from UNITA. UNITA was 
a conventional army with battalions, etc. while 
RENAMO is a soft guerrilla movement making it 
very difficult to defeat. Even the death of Dhlakama 
may not resolve the problem as the succession 
debate has already begun within the party. There is 
currently a full crisis of political representation in 
Mozambique. The only good thing that could 
happen in Mozambique would be a social 
revolution in the cities. The cities are FRELIMO’s 
strongholds and if the populace demand peace it 
could potentially change the situation. 
RLS: MOZAMBIQUE IS UNDER A SERIOUS RISK OF BANKRUPTCY DUE TO THE 
SO-CALLED “TUNA BONDS” AND OTHERS RECENTLY REVEALED TO BE 1, 4 
BILLION DOLLARS. TO WHAT EXTENT DOES NYUSI HAVE THE ABILITY TO 
RESOLVE THIS CRISIS OR DOES THIS PROBLEM LIE MORE AT THE LEVEL OF 
THE PARTY ITSELF?   
MC: I’m a historian and not an economist but I 
don’t believe Nyusi can effectively meet this 
challenge. To do so he would need to force foreign 
companies to pay taxes. They enter the country 
under very favourable agreements, to the extent 
that workers in Mozambique pay more taxes than 
what these capitalist companies do. Yes, it’s a 
classical situation worldwide, but it’s more 
damaging to a country like Mozambique. On the 
other hand, it’s important to stress that it is the 
FRELIMO bourgeoisie that benefits the most from 
these bonds that have created the economic crisis. 
Pressured by the IMF, Nyusi definitely needs to 
take action, but this will not completely resolve the 
economic crisis. At the latest meeting of 
FRELIMO’s Central Committee one more 
anticorruption plan was agreed upon to convince 
the public that corruption is treated seriously when, 
in fact, nothing is being done. For example, in the 
cases of EMATUM and PROÍNDICUS, the first 
course of action should have been to arrest former 
president Armando Guebuza and former Finance 
Minister Manuel Chang. Both are behind the 
current crisis with both authorising and financially 
benefitting from the bonds.     
RLS: THE US STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2015) 
EXPOSED COUNTLESS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN MOZAMBIQUE 
INCLUDING ACTS OF REPRESSION OF VOICES IN DISAGREEMENT WITH THE 
FRELIMO GOVERNMENT. IN FACT, THE SAME REPORT POINTS TO THE 
ASSASSINATION OF PROFESSOR CISTAC AS BEING POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. 
THIS YEAR (2016) ASSASSINATIONS AND ATTEMPTS OF SELECTIVE 
ASSASSINATION OF OPPOSING VOICES ARE TAKING PLACE (CANAL DE 
MOÇAMBIQUE).ϵTO WHAT EXTENT CAN REPRESSION AND ASSASSINATION 
OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION VOICES IN MOZAMBIQUE BE ASSOCIATED WITH A 
                                                          
ϵ Equipa de Investigação do Canal de Moçambique, “A 
lista de mortes encomendadas pelo governo: esquadrão 
da morte,” Canal de Moçambique, April 13, 2016, 2-3  
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PROBABLE HISTORICAL LEGACY OF POLITICAL STRUGGLES FOR 
INDEPENDENCE?      
MC: I think the current situation where security 
services are trying to physically eliminate RENAMO 
cadres is comparable to the military dictatorships 
in Latin America in the 60’s and 70’s. It’s not a 
historical legacy. As an historian I have to apply the 
concepts very well and would not yet classify the 
Mozambican regime as a fascist regime. But this 
behaviour is similar that of any extreme-right 
military dictatorship in the 60’s and 70’s. To 
indiscriminately kill everyone considered 
subversives. Because Mozambique is still 
predominantly a rural country, this attitude will not 
weaken RENAMO but push it back into the bush. 
The outcome will be more civil war. It is important 
not to ignore that this might actually be FRELIMO’s 
strategy, eliminate the leader in order to stop or 
avoid negotiations. This also happens in the 
conflict between Israel and Palestine. Whenever 
there is an attempt to negotiate, Israel expands its 
colonies in the West Bank, or following a selective 
assassination there is the obvious retaliation by the 
Palestinians.. This does, however, demonstrate a 
sinister side of the security services in 
Mozambique - assassination for political gain. 
There is the belief that if RENAMO expanded its 
military actions the war would be over in 15 days. 
The government would easily fall because, 
although it is extremely violent, internally it remains 
very corrupt.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I cannot entirely deny that this is an historical 
attitude considering FRELIMO viewing itself as the 
nation and, in this context, the opposition is 
illegitimate so must be eliminated.  Whoever is 
against FRELIMO is also against the nation. In this 
sense you become an enemy and have to be 
eliminated. There is an historical continuity but it’s 
important to stress that because it is happening 
now and not five years ago, indicates that that the 
security services are employing certain behavioural 
traits similar to those historically used by South 
American or South African extreme-right regimes.  
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